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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

I

Plaintiff-Respondent,

:

v.

t

JESSIE JIMINEZ#

:

Defendant-Appellant.

Case No. 870399-CA

Category No. 2

:

RESPONSE TO PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
Is defendant entitled to a rehearing even if this Court
assumes that a videotape existed where there was no showing that
there was evidence vital to the defense on that tape and there
are live witnesses available to testify to the facts of the
alleged assault?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged defendant with assault by a prisoner
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102.5 (1978) for an
incident occurring on March 14, 1987 in the Salt Lake County
Jail.

Judge Frank Noel dismissed the charge on defendant's

motion on September 9, 1987. The State appealed and this Court
reversed Judge Noel's dismissal.

Defendant has now petitioned

for rehearing.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The pertinent facts are contained in the original
appellant's brief.

The State disagrees with some of the fact

allegations made by defendant in the rehearing petition.
are:

These

1.

M

At a hearing in Circuit Court prior to June 11,

1987, the date on which the preliminary hearing in the instant
case was held, the prosecutor informed defense counsel that a
videotape of the incident existed."

(Reh. Pet. at 2).

Defendant

states that this is a fact even though she admits in a footnote
that there is nothing in the record to support this allegation.
2.

"The State was not prepared to argue the motion,

and the trial court continued the hearing to August 7 and ordered
the State to respond specifically as to whether a videotape
capturing the incident had been made, what was on that tape,
whether the tape had been destroyed and how."

(Reh. Pet. at 2).

Defendant provides no record citation for these allegations
because there is nothing in the record to support the allegation.
3.

Twice defendant states that a "substitute

prosecutor who was unfamiliar with the case" appeared at hearings
(Reh. Pet. at 2).

While the State acknowledges that the minute

entries indicate that other prosecutors appeared on these dates,
there is nothing in the record to support the allegation that
these persons were unfamiliar with the case.
Other than these three items, the State agrees with
defendant's statement of the facts.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Even if this Court assumes the existence of a
videotape, defendant is not entitled to a rehearing because
defendant never demonstrated that any evidence on that tape was
material in the constitutional sense. As this Court stated in
the opinion, because defendant offered no evidence of what the
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videotape showed, no one knows whether there was any evidence
that was vital to the defense that was destroyed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A REHEARING
BECAUSE, EVEN IF A VIDEOTAPE EXISTED, THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
MATERIALITY.
Defendant asserts that this Court misapprehended facts
and law in this case in reversing the trial court's order and
that this Court should, therefore, grant a rehearing.
Specifically, she complains of this Court's finding that
defendant never presented any evidence that there was a videotape
that depicted the alleged assault.

Defendant, however, misses

the thrust of this Court's ruling and, as argued below, defendant
is not entitled to a rehearing.
The crux of this Court's ruling in this case is that,
to support dismissal, defendant was required to show that the
alleged videotape contained evidence that was material in the
constitutional sense.

To be constitutionally material, the

evidence that was destroyed must be vital to defendant's guilt or
innocence.

The possibility that the information might have

helped defendant is not sufficient to establish materiality.
Slip op. at 3.

Defendant focuses on whether in fact there was a

videotape and ignores the meaning of this language, which is
that, even if there was a videotape, defendant did not establish
that it contained anything vital to her defense.
As argued in the State's initial brief, there remain
live witnesses to this alleged offense who are available to
•3-

testify at trial.

It will be up to the jury to decide the

credibility of those witnesses after they are subjected to crossexamination on the issue of whether an assault occurred.

Where

there are live witnesses to testify to the events, the tape
cannot be material in the absence of evidence that there was
something on the tape bearing on the issue of guilt.

See State

v. Perez, 687 P.2d 1214, 1219 (Ariz. 1984) and other cases cited
at page 5 of Appellant's Brief.
Defendant argues that this Court must assume that there
was evidence before the trial court that there was something
material on the tape.

She asserts that the State is attempting

to circumvent this finding by purposely not ordering a transcript
of the arguments on the motion.

She also complains for the first

time on rehearing, that the order drafted by the State was
purposely drafted to avoid meaningful review.

These allegations

are unfounded and do not go to the heart of the issues before
this Court.
It would not be logical for this Court to assume that
there was evidence before the lower court supporting a finding
that there was something material on any tape that had existed
for three reasons.

First, the record does not indicate that

there was an evidentiary hearing.

If the court never took

evidence, then no one established anything about the content of
any tape.
Second, it is clear from the record that neither the
prosecutor nor defense counsel viewed the tape before it was
destroyed because defendant did not request the tape until July
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2, 1987 (R. 21) and the record shows that the tape of that day's
bookings was destroyed by March 17, 1987 (72 hours after the date
of the offense, see R. 17, 28).
Third, the trial court's order does not support
defendant'8 claim that the court found that a constitutionally
material tape existed because the order states that "any" tape of
the incident was destroyed (R. 41). The use of the word any
belies a finding that there was actually a videotape containing
constitutionally material evidence.

Defendant points out that

her attorney did not approve this order as to form, and claims,
therefore, that it was "artfully drafted" to omit findings by the
trial court.

It is rational, however, that if the trial court

had made the significant finding that the tape was
constitutionally material in the sense that it contained
something vital to defendant, the court would have amended the
language of the order or refused to sign it.

It is also

interesting to note that defendant did not object to the form of
the order at any time prior to the rehearing petition.

While

defendant could not reasonably have been expected to object prior
to the Judge signing the order, since it was mailed to defense
counsel on Sept. 9, 1987 and the Judge signed it on that same
date, defendant could have interposed a later objection but did
not.

Defendant should not be allowed for the first time on

rehearing to assert that the record is incorrect where defendant
had earlier opportunities to bring any deficiency to the trial
court's attention.
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Defendant also claims that the prosecutor told defense
counsel at a hearing in circuit court prior to the preliminary
hearing that there was a videotape of the incident.

There is

nothing in the record to support this allegation, but defendant
argues that this is because the State failed to order transcripts
of the hearings in this case.

Defendant does not indicate,

however, that this alleged representation was on the record and
defendant never asserted that such a representation had been made
in the initial briefing of this case.

Clearly, such a

representation, if made, would lend some support to defendant's
argument that a videotape existed even though the record later
indicates that the prosecutor did not know if any videotape
captured the alleged assault (R. 28, 32). However, at no time
does either party refer to this alleged representation in any of
the written documents submitted to Judge No€*l and Judge Noel made
no finding of this fact.

There is nothing in the record to

indicate that Judge Noel had before him this information or any
information from the preliminary hearing at the time he dismissed
the case.

However, even if a transcript would establish that the

prosecutor said a videotape existed, or this Court assumes that a
videotape existed, the trial court's ruling was erroneous because
there was no finding that the videotape was constitutionally
material and there was no finding that a videotape capturing the
incident existed because the judge only ruled that destruction of
w

anyM tape necessitated dismissal.
Indeed, if defendant's factual assertions are to be

accepted by this Court, the fact that the trial court ordered the
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prosecutor to state whether there was a videotape and what was on
it and the prosecutor responded that the videotape of all
bookings was recycled 72 hours after the booking date (R. 28),
supports the State's position that there was no evidence that the
tape contained something material to defendant.

Given the lack

of findings of materiality, this Court must assume that there was
no evidence presented on this issue.
Co., 579 P.2d 917 (Utah 1978).

Bagnall v. Suburbia Land

Again, if defendant thought the

trial court's order and lack of findings was not an accurate
reflection of what occurred in the hearings on the motion,
defendant could have objected to the order at some point prior to
rehearing.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests this Court
to deny the petition for rehearing because defendant fails to
establish that this Court misapprehended relevant facts or law.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this j^P^

day of November,

1988.
DAVID L. WILKINSON
Attorney General

//SANDRA L. SJOGREN
\s
Assistant Attorney General
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